Friday, November 19, 2021
Catholic Voices of Dissent on COVID-19 Vaccines
Along these lines of subsidiarity, why is there hardly any recognition on the part of upper-echelon clergy of the many Catholics and pro-lifers who, wanting to resist abortion and other modern ills with “maximum determination,” voluntarily decide to withdraw from the emerging pharmaceutical dystopia? Is this not akin to St. Benedict of Nursia’s quest for a more authentic albeit demanding Christian life? The hierarchy should be more sensitive to the signs of the times and the talk of parallel societies and “Benedict options,” for these are signs that the globalist, one-world ideal pedalled by pharmaceutical corporations and their proxies is considered by many anti-Christ, not least of which because it in no way respects subsidiarity.
Douglas Farrow writes in his November 3, 2021 article Vaccine Passes for the Mass in Crisis Magazine:
That is why we are witnessing, as in Grand Falls, government-imposed and episcopally-sanctioned diocesan schisms. But schism, in ecclesial terms, is a cardinal sin. And this sin presently entails—we must not overlook this!—a twofold assault on the little ones whom Jesus insisted His disciples permit to approach Him.
First, it helps sustain an attack on their bodies, for the authorities are now gearing up to subject these little ones, who are at virtually no risk from COVID-19, to the far greater risks of the injections. (Of this “far greater” there is no statistical doubt; only the sin of sloth prevents anyone from knowing that.) And why? As ever, for dishonest gain; but also for the sake of acclimatising the entire population to the shiny Nowa Huta that is its Pharma-run future.
More importantly, it is a stone of stumbling for their souls, a rock of offense. They and their parents are being told that they are not welcome in church and/or that they do not require their church. Virtual church will do for them if virtual proof of vaccination is wanting. What won’t do is not being vaccinated. For as the World Health Organization reverently declared in a recent global synod, “in vaccines we trust.”
All people are being told, then, that the leadership in such churches is not half as serious about the things of God as about the things of man, even the medically and politically perverse things of man, by which man oppresses man. When that message is fully absorbed, what will be the result? What indeed, if not the proliferation of cardinal sins and a still more obvious apostasy? As if seconding the power of excommunication to the ministry of health were not obvious enough!
Archbishop for the Military Services, USA Timothy Broglio, October 12, 2021, Statement on Coronavirus Vaccines and the Sanctity of Conscience
Even if an individual’s decision seems erroneous or inconsistent to others, conscience does not lose its dignity. This belief permeates Catholic moral theology as well as First Amendment jurisprudence. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, “[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” The denial of religious accommodations, or punitive or adverse personnel actions taken against those who raise earnest, conscience-based objections, would be contrary to federal law and morally reprehensible.
The right of conscience does not merely exist alongside common good; conscience is a component of common good.
The denial of this principle inevitably leads to totalitarianism. As Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Ratzinger wrote that “one must follow a certain conscience, or at least not act against it.” History illustrates that the penultimate policy of totalitarianism is to disallow the following of conscience; the ultimate policy of totalitarianism is to force people to act against their own consciences.
The attack on conscience is devastating to the common good. As Cardinal Ratzinger phrased it, “the silencing of conscience leads to the dehumanization of the world.”
Jane Smith, September 27, 2021, Crisis Magazine, The Fake Theology behind Vaccine Mandates
None of these documents, however, have the degree of magisterial authority to require assent; they are all low-level documents or non-magisterial statements that cannot impose obligations on Catholics. While these sources do attempt to make a strong case that there is a “moral responsibility” to receive the vaccine, none speak of a moral obligation to do so. And, as we shall show, according to Catholic theology, they can’t do so. (For an explanation of the various levels of authority of Church teaching, see the “Doctrinal Commentary on concluding formula of Professio fidei.”)
Bishop Athanasius Schneider, September 14, 2021
The fact that abortion is in the causal chain in the testing and/or producing of all the current Covid-19 vaccines means that they are gravely immoral. I will not argue that here. Please see my letter where I discuss it thoroughly and definitively.
So in that sense Catholics are not disobeying the Pope because the directive itself is undermining the clarity of the Catholic doctrine and the Catholic witness against abortion and the fetal industry. Furthermore, the Pope is not teaching in this case infallibly.
Bishop Thomas Olmstead, letter to the faithful regarding COVID-19 vaccinations and individual decisions based on a well-formed conscience (August 27, 2021)
Bishop of a diverse flock with the care of many souls, I continue to encourage the prayerful consideration that each individual must make in regard to receiving the vaccine. For those who have discerned to receive one, they can be assured that they can do so in good conscience. For those who have discerned not to receive one, they too can do so in good conscience. What is primary for us as individuals is to form our conscience through the teachings of the Church.
Archbishop Samuel J. Aquila, Bishop Stephen J. Berg, James R. Golka, Jorge Rodriguez, A Letter from the Bishops of Colorado on COVID-19 Vaccine Mandates (August 5, 2021)
If any person comes to an informed judgment that he or she should receive or not receive a vaccine, that person should follow their conscience, and they should not be penalized for doing so. We encourage any individual seeking exemption to consult their employer or school. The Colorado Catholic Conference also has a letter template available to be signed by pastors of the Faithful if a Catholic wants a written record that they are seeking exemption on religious grounds.
Eric Sammons, Abortion-Tainted Vaccines: From Objection to Obligation April 22, 2021, Crisis Magazine:
A careful reading of the statement reveals a far different emphasis versus what we now hear from our Church leaders, including those at the Vatican. After detailing the moral arguments regarding the degree of cooperation one might have when taking an abortion-tainted vaccine, the PAL states forcefully,
Therefore, doctors and fathers of families have a duty to take recourse to alternative vaccines (if they exist), putting pressure on the political authorities and health systems so that other vaccines without moral problems become available. They should take recourse, if necessary, to the use of conscientious objection with regard to the use of vaccines produced by means of cell lines of aborted human foetal origin. Equally, they should oppose by all means (in writing, through the various associations, mass media, etc.) the vaccines which do not yet have morally acceptable alternatives, creating pressure so that alternative vaccines are prepared, which are not connected with the abortion of a human foetus, and requesting rigorous legal control of the pharmaceutical industry producers. (emphasis added)
“They should oppose by all means…the vaccines which do not yet have morally acceptable alternatives”—do we see this happening today? Far from opposing “by all means” these vaccines, the Church rather is advocating for them, to the point of assisting in their promotion and even their distribution.
Bishop Athanasius Schneider, December 11, 2020, Covid vaccines: ‘The ends cannot justify the means’
In the case of vaccines made from the cell lines of aborted human fetuses, we see a clear contradiction between the Catholic doctrine to categorically, and beyond the shadow of any doubt, reject abortion in all cases as a grave moral evil that cries out to heaven for vengeance (see Catechism of the Catholic Church n. 2268, n. 2270), and the practice of regarding vaccines derived from aborted fetal cell lines as morally acceptable in exceptional cases of “urgent need” — on the grounds of remote, passive, material cooperation. To argue that such vaccines can be morally licit if there is no alternative is in itself contradictory and cannot be acceptable for Catholics.
Bishop Joseph Strickland, December 8, 2020, Letter to Flock of East Texas
Every procured abortion murders an innocent human person. For university, government, or industrial scientists to use materials obtained from the remains of an electively aborted child in the research, development, testing, or production of any vaccine is immoral and constitutes formal cooperation in evil. We must never cease to protest this practice with maximum determination to defend the dignity and sacredness of children in the womb. They are not objects to be used but persons to be received as gifts, our brothers and sisters. As your shepherd, I cannot in good conscience receive a vaccine that has been produced using an aborted child. There are ethical vaccines in development which are worth waiting for.
Thursday, November 18, 2021
Tuesday, November 16, 2021
All you need to know/All I would like to know
Monday, November 15, 2021
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a Super Statute
Reasonableness not up for debate; sincerity, tread lightly
RFRA applies to all sincerely held religious beliefs, whether or not central to, or mandated by, a particular religious organization or tradition. Religious adherents will often be required to draw lines in the application of their religious beliefs, and government is not competent to assess the reasonableness of such lines drawn, nor would it be appropriate for government to do so. Thus, for example, a government agency may not second-guess the determination of a factory worker that, consistent with his religious precepts, he can work on a line producing steel that might someday make its way into armaments but cannot work on a line producing the armaments themselves. Nor may the Department of Health and Human Services second-guess the determination of a religious employer that providing contraceptive coverage to its employees would make the employer complicit in wrongdoing in violation of the organization's religious precepts.
The specific religious practice must be examined rather than the general scope of applicable religious tenets, and the plaintiff's “sincerity” in espousing that practice is largely a matter of individual credibility. Id. at 792. In fact, the sincerity of a plaintiff's engagement in a particular religious practice is rarely challenged. Id. at 791. As Moussazadeh explains, “[t]hough the sincerity inquiry is important, it must be handled with a light touch, or ‘judicial shyness.’ ” Id. at 792 (quoting A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 262 (5th Cir.2010)). “[E]xamin[ing] religious convictions any more deeply would stray into the realm of religious inquiry, an area into which we are forbidden to tread.” Id. (fn. omitted). Both before and following Moussazadeh, claims of sincere religious belief in a particular practice have been accepted on little more than the plaintiff's credible assertions. See, e.g., Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir.2013) (Muslim prisoner's desire to wear a beard not challenged by TDCJ); Betenbaugh, 611 F.3d at 261–62 (Native American schoolboy wearing long hair a sincere religious belief; Texas RFRA parallels RFRA); Mayfield v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir.2008) (Odin worshiper's religious need for runestones and rune literature not challenged by TDCJ).
Officials can be sued for monetary damages, in their personal capacities
Respondents Muhammad Tanvir, Jameel Algibhah, and Naveed Shinwari are practicing Muslims who claim that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents placed them on the No Fly List in retaliation for their refusal to act as informants against their religious communities. Respondents sued various agents in their official capacities, seeking removal from the No Fly List. They also sued the agents in their individual capacities for money damages. According to respondents, the retaliation cost them substantial sums of money: airline tickets wasted and income from job opportunities lost. More than a year after respondents sued, the Department of Homeland Security informed them that they could now fly, thus mooting the claims for injunctive relief.
The District Court then dismissed the individual-capacity claims for money damages, ruling that RFRA does not permit monetary relief. The Second Circuit reversed. 894 F. 3d 449 (2018). It determined that RFRA’s express remedies provision, combined with the statutory definition of “Government,” authorizes claims against federal officials in their individual capacities. Relying on our precedent and RFRA’s broad protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that the open-ended phrase “appropriate relief” encompasses money damages against officials. We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and now affirm.
An important thing to keep in mind about Tanzin v. Tanvir, is that the plaintiffs had already been removed from the No Fly List by the time the case was before the Court. The government argued that this fact made the case moot. But the Court disagreed. Plaintiffs might still be entitled to damages. To me, this means that federal employees who take the injections after having their religious exceptions denied might still have non-moot claims for damages.
A super statute which creates standing
Perhaps one of its most important aspects is the RFRA's power to provide plaintiffs with standing to bring their claims in federal court. The RFRA mandated that the law “'be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.’” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 696 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc—3(g)). “RFRA operates as a kind of super statute, displacing the normal operation of other federal laws.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
A big question is whether the RFRA provide federal employees with standing to file lawsuits against the federal government. When addressing this issue, the the EEOC's website lists four cases.
They represent a mixed bag.
In two circuit court cases, the 8th and 3rd Circuits found that Title VII provides the "exclusive remedy" for religious discrimination claims of federal employees.
- Harrell v. Donahue, 638 F.3d 975, 984 (8th Cir. 2011)(holding RFRA claims alleging religious discrimination in federal employment are barred because “Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for [] claims of religious discrimination”);
- Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “[i]t is equally clear that Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for job-related claims of federal religious discrimination, despite [plaintiff’s] attempt to rely upon the provisions of RFRA”). [In a third case, not on the EEOC website, the 9th Circuit sided with the 8th and the 3rd. See Holly v. Jewell, 196 F.Supp.3d 1079, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (dismissing constitutional claim arising from alleged First Amendment religious discrimination as covered exclusively by Title VII)]
- Lister v. Def. Logistics Agency, No. 2:05-CV-495, 2006 WL 162534, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2006) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss as to RFRA claim and finding that “Title VII does not preclude Plaintiff from pursuing claims under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and RFRA” because “[a]lthough the claims arise from the same factual circumstance as the Title VII claim, the claims are distinct from Plaintiff’s claim for employment discrimination and therefore are not precluded by Title VII”).
- In addition, one appellate court has held that a federal employee is not preempted from bringing a RFRA claim against another agency (not his employer) to challenge that agency’s action interfering with employment. See, e.g., Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013) (allowing employee’s RFRA claim to proceed against agency that enforced building security regulations and denied her permission to enter building while wearing a kirpan).
Targore is an interesting case. Plaintiff there brought a Title VII case against the her employer (IRS) as well as an RFRA case against DHS which had barred her from wearing a religious weapon which had led to her discharge from the IRS. The 5th Circuit dismissed the Title VII claim, but not on standing grounds. Rather, the court found that the IRS did not control the building and had not failed its duty to attempt to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff. The 5th Circuit found that the plaintiff did have standing and a triable case against DHS.
The RFRA has only grown stronger since Targore and the other cases cited by the EEOC. As Justice Gorsuch wrote in Bostock, "[b]ecause the "RFRA operates as a kind of super statute, displacing the normal operation of other federal laws, it might supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate cases."
So, what does this all portend for vaccine mandate cases? It seems to me that if the RFRA's definition of "government officials" includes FBI agents in their personal capacities, it also includes presidents who sign executive orders in their official and personal capacities, as well as the officials who make up the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force, and various agency officials who make decisions about whether to provide employees with religious exceptions and what kinds of questions about their religion they should be forced to answer.
In my view, there are two distinct religious burden issues. First, there is the issue of the religious burden imposed on those who have a religious belief that runs contra taking the mandated injections. Second, there is the issue of the burdens involved in seeking relief from the mandate. For instance, if the exception process is an elaborate, bad faith charade where officials know that they will not be accommodating any religious exceptions, but they lead employees on to write out requests for them...that would seem to me to represent an undue burden on religious practice.
But I will caution the reader to do his own research. My research on these issues is done without access to legal resources like Westlaw, and it is done on my own time (which is pretty limited by fact of the five children who keep me pretty busy). Which is to say that it is always possible that I am missing something important. Do your own research (and if you find any relevant authority, please send it my way).
david.foley.JMJ@protonmail.com